The Death of Sight: An Interrogation of Campus Surveillance

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Privacy and security often exist in opposition to each other. To monitor an entryway via camera is to have a record of all who cross the threshold. As a society we must decide how to balance these rights. And they are rights. Article 3 of the United Nations' *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* from 1948 states "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person." Further, Article 12 guarantees "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." The right to privacy also has been accepted in United States law. Although no one amendment of the United States Constitution protects an American's right to privacy, Supreme Court cases such as *Griswold v. Connecticut* have reaffirmed this right. Surveillance often takes the form of cameras. This paper explores how cameras function at Pomona College and ways people can investigate surveillance at similar institutions.

At Pomona College, security cameras exist primarily to curb theft. In 2014, the College expanded camera usage from only "computer labs and parking garages" to more sites "such as bike racks and residence hall entrances" as Tidmarsh (2014) reports. Many students opposed the installation of cameras and viewed the cameras as restrictions on liberties. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union of the Claremont Colleges stated "Even with the best intentions and principles, we view it as highly likely that [alcohol related policy violations] will at least occasionally be caught on film," and called for "clarity concerning Pomona's legal obligations and recourse for both the College and students depicted on CCTV against involuntary disclosure," (Tidmarsh (2014)). The College claims that the cameras do not violate reasonable expectation of privacy and that the footage will not be used to prosecute students for policy violations (Tidmarsh (2014); Ocampo (2014)). The footage still represents a liability as police could subpoena the footage and prosecute a student.

Additionally, the College claims, as of 2014, that the "cameras cannot be used for active monitoring of students, faculty, or staff members, and monitoring of public spaces must be in accordance with existing college policies," (Tidmarsh (2014)). The existing college polices do not address security cameras, and the administration has been working on a camera policy for years. This language represents a shift from previous discussions of camera usage at Pomona College. In 2011, Dean of Students Miriam Feldblum told The Student Life, "Just think: What would happen if instead of watching the video, [a dean] was actually just standing there face to face–we should go with those expectations" (Booth (2011)). How panoptic. Students should navigate the campus as if a dean were watching, never knowing if one actually is looking.

The Claremont College's Campus Safety dispatch monitors cameras across the campuses. In conversation, Lieutenant Ernie Didier (2017b) of Campus Safety indicated that the images are not acted on unless the activities are found to be suspicious and indicated that "any activity at 3am is suspicious." It is surprising that late night activity is suspicious on a college campus where people operate at all different times of day. In particular, how does dispatch know if a subject is faculty, staff, or student? The monitor is human and thus fallible. Likely, they cannot know. Robert Robinson (2017), Assistant Vice President of Facilities and Campus Services at Pomona College, controls camera access. When asked about the monitoring of cameras, he stated "people think that Big Brother is watching, but Big Brother gets bored." If Big Brother is human, Robinson is correct. Machines, however, do not tire.

Computers, with their ever increasing image processing capabilities, are able to process all the cameras simultaneously, tracking features and searching for anomalies. Consider the work of the Australian company iCetana, whose product looks for abnormal behavior or events and displays the relevant cameras to a human operator. In a case study of the use of their product at an "inner city college campus," iCetana (2017) states: "Typically the events detected and shown [to the operator] represented only 1% of the total

video footage streaming from the camera network to the control room - effectively reducing the operator's load and enabling them to focus on other important tasks. Of the incidents detected many were the typical security events such as vandalism, loitering, fights, anti-social behaviour and vehicle violations." Only suspicious activity is show to the operator. Therefore, if the operator sees an image, s/he should be suspicious of people in the frame. iCetana computerizes the detection of threats and crimes. In this case, Big Brother need not get bored as everything he sees has been deemed suspicious by iCetana's algorithm.

Even if Big Brother dozes off, he has a searchable record. The documentation, superhuman memory, and instant recall of information technology has led to a society where a nearly total record of a person's actions exists. A person's stupid comments and drunken actions are on the record, able to be recalled with a few key strokes.

Camera systems do not instantly delete the footage which does not garner suspicion. At the Claremont Colleges, footage is held for thirty days, unless there is reason to keep the footage longer. Even mundane activity is kept on record. This seems to be the policy despite a formal camera policy.

Surveillance and documentation is needed to ensure safety and security. A victim of bike theft is glad if a camera records the thief, but after a while the footage is not needed. If no crime is noticed, why should the footage be kept? We need rules to regulate the storage and destruction of security footage.

The presence of a camera can intimidate, so we need to define acceptable uses of cameras and the penalties for parties who violate usage standards. In New York City, police (NYPD) use hand held cameras to document protests. Protestors see that they are being watched by police and may self regulate. The protesters are no longer anonymous. Not only are they on record as engaging in protest but their actions are also recorded.

NYPD polices prohibit such recording unless an officer believes that a crime is imminent. However, recently released documents, acquired under Freedom of Information

Act requests by Joseph (2017), shows that the NYPD has systematically violated these requirements with regard to Black Lives Matter protests. The police are not directly interfering with the protests, they merely record to punish later. Even with guidelines in place, enforcement of violations becomes problematic.

Such power of video is seen just next door at Claremont McKenna College (CMC). On Thursday, April 6, over 200 students protested a scheduled speech at the Marian Miner Cook Athenaeum by conservative, pro-police speaker Heather Mac Donald. Protesters blocked all entrances and exits to the Athenaeum to prevent the speech from happening.

According to the article "Students Protest Ath Speaker Heather Mac Donald, Talk Moved to Livestream" (2017), CMC President Hiram Chodosh sent a campus wide email which promised to hold students accountable, stating: "Blocking access to buildings violates College policy. CMC students who are found to have violated policies will be held accountable. We will also give a full report to the other Claremont Colleges, who have responsibility for their own students." According to Didier (2017a), the protests were caught on CMC's security cameras. He further stated that they were not releasing the footage at the time. Director of Media Relations for CMC, Joann Young, told Kabbany (2017) "that campus officials will review videos, photos and social media posts as part of a thorough investigation into the matter." CMC is using the same tactics as NYPD, employing cameras to catch, punish, and scare (Black Lives Matter) protesters.

Total surveillance, which is becoming ordinary and expected, threatens privacy. In the past, the CMC protesters would feel protected as individuals in a crowed. If they were not arrested at the protest, the protesters would be safe from retaliation. The situation is not so today. Digital memories are Funesian, yet modern computational power allows the recall of a day to take less than a day's time, avoiding Funes' paralysis. The current state of surveillance concerns many people. Some have worked, with varying success, to actively resist surveillance.

However, to attempt to break out of the system is to attract suspicion. Services like

Tor which anonymize users online are associated with drug markets and child pornography. Why else would a person want anonymity? Encrypting emails, messaging with Signal, and protecting communication implies nefarious desires. State actors have a history of large scale mass surveillance both visual and digital. One need not look beyond the revelations of Edward Snowden.

Privacy should be the default not a luxury. As Warren Buffet said: "If a cop follows you for 500 miles, you're going to get a ticket" (Crippen (2013)). Even law abiding citizens will slip and transgress some law. Our society intentionally does not pursue every crime, for the result, almost inevitably, would be total imprisonment, an unpopular outcome. Still, implementing security measures is seen as admitting to criminal intent.

The increased suspicion is why more people must take additional precautions. Many law abiding citizens need privacy. Consider journalists or whistle blowers or lawyers or scientists developing dangerous or sensitive technology. The list goes on. More encrypted data means more noise. More people resisting makes everyone safer as those who need protection are hidden. We can camouflage the important signals in a sea of mundane noise.

Security and intelligence officials often advocate for restrictions on encryption and privacy measures. Recently, the United Kingdom's government has requested a 'backdoor' to the WhatsApp messaging service after a terrorist was believed to use the service, Burlacu (2017) reports. The existence of a 'backdoor' compromises the entire service. Non-state actors could exploit the backdoor for unintended purposes. Encryption is critical to secure digital banking and confidential communication. Privacy must be protected.

To break out of the cycle, one can also slow down. Mechanical vision derives its power from its superhuman speed. If the mechanical is brought to human speed, it becomes obsolete. In today's society of secular speed, slow spaces are hard to find. Bringing surveillance to contemplative pace would be a revolutionary act of resistance. The human would be reintroduced as the primary looker. Monitoring cameras would become a slow, monotonous process. Much of what the monitor sees would be mundane. Sontag

(2004) explains the power of contemplation:

> Certain photographs-emblems of suffering, such as the snapshot of the little boy
> in the Warsaw Ghetto in 1943, his hands raised, being herded to the transport
> to a death camp-can be used like memento mori, as objects of contemplation to
> deepen one's sense of reality; as secular icons, if you will. But that would seem
> to demand the equivalent of a sacred or meditative space in which to look at
> them. Space reserved for being serious is hard to come by in a modern society,
> whose chief model of a public space is the mega-store (which may also be an
> airport or a museum).

The surveillance room would become such a space. The camera operator would see life as it is lived, complete. The human condition would be on display. The guards will see suffering, pain, joy, exhaustion, ... They will see the spectrum of humanity for a computer will not pick out the suspects. The viewer would be more likely to recognize the subject's humanity. The surveilled are living people.

Ideally, security should be such a contemplative space. Experts must face the ethical questions of mass surveillance. They must recognize peoples' individuality and implement safeguards and regulations on surveillance monitors to protect that humanity.

This ideal of slowing down, however, is a pipe dream. Security professionals see slow, critical contemplation as adverse to their goals. The National Security Agency and other intelligence organizations rely on powerful computation to process their petabytes of information. Institutions want total security and the fastest image processing they can acquire. Even Campus Safety would argue that such slowing would increase the threat level on campus. Ergo, attempts to slow down may be futile. More realistically, efforts of advocacy groups and artists will make the the public aware of the trade-off between privacy and security.

Many artists have addressed surveillance in their practice and are often critical of the security state. Their resistance and art comes in many forms. One can resist by

recontextualizing surveillance images. By considering operational images in an aesthetic context, one problematizes the whole security apparatus. Art spaces allow one to question every part of the work from the formal to the conceptual. From the way the shot is framed, to the location of the camera, to the subjects, the image is open for deconstruction. Although, the art-economic knot tends to sweep up images, as Sekula (2016) argues happened to Steichen's work. The works could also become democratized and provide public insight into a traditionally shrouded arena. The images need not be edited even. They may be presented in the Duchampian style of a readymade.

I wanted to make an artwork about Pomona College's surveillance apparatus, so I went to Campus Safety and saw that officers could load the cameras on their desktop computers. Immediately, I wanted to show these cameras to students. Most students know that there are security cameras on campus but not much more about them. For my project, I would display all of the live cameras at Pomona College. Through the process of making the project, I saw how even a benign, liberal institution, focused on transparency, such as Pomona College, seems ill-at-ease with public recognition of its surveillance.

I knew that I would face institutional opposition and wanted a letter of support stating that my project coincided with the academic mission of the College, so I approached Mark Andrejevic, my professor, Media Studies Department Chair, and surveillance scholar about the project.

I returned to Campus Safety to request the footage. Didier directed me to Pomona College's Information Technology Services (ITS), which houses the servers. Patrick Flannery, Associate Director for Systems Infrastructure Services, stated that ITS does not have access to the cameras and that they only house the servers. Flannery directed me to Robert Robinson, Assistant Vice President of Facilities and Campus Services at Pomona College. I was surprised by the lack of hierarchy. No one quite knew who could grant access to the cameras.

After I met with Robinson, he later emailed me: "I have discussed your request with

my staff and we have some concerns related to privacy issues. They may not be insurmountable but we feel that your request for this should come from your professor through the Office of the Dean of the College. I would suggest that your professor speak with Fernando Lozano in Dean Bilger's Office." The public statements of the College argued that the cameras would not violate privacy. Robinson's statement seemed to belie that message.

Following Robinson's advice, I asked Andrejevic to reach out to Fernando Lozano, Associate Dean of the College who is in charge of the institutional review board (IRB). Lozano emailed Andrejevic: "I have a very uneasy feeling about this, mostly because of IRB concerns. To the extent that these recordings will be used as data, we should have cleared IRB before collecting the data. The[n] there is the policy issue."

As this project would be an artwork, IRB was not needed. Administration claims that the cameras do not violate reasonable expectation of privacy resolved any privacy concern. I further claimed that the camera feeds were already able to be viewed by the public as I walked into the Campus Safety office without an appointment, and without requesting my student ID, an officer showed me the camera feeds. Not only was I allowed to view the feeds up in the dispatch room, but the officer also pulled up feeds at his desk and showed me both live streams and previously recorded footage. My project would make more accessible what could already be seen.

Lozano approached Vice President for Academic Affairs and Dean of the College, Audrey Bilger. Dean Bilger requested that I provide a list of the cameras I would like to display. As I did not know what cameras existed, I requested with support from Lozano "a complete list of the security cameras on and monitoring Pomona College property" from Director of Campus Safety Stan Skipworth. Skipworth replied "I'm sorry, I'm not at liberty to disclose that information. You would need to acquire that from their Facilities Management offices." The head of academics at Pomona College could not grant access to a list of cameras monitoring the College. I was shocked yet proceeded with the advised path.

I made the same request of Robinson. Campus Safety Dispatch then emailed me a list of Pomona College cameras. Clearly, Campus Safety could release such information, but a request authorized by the Dean of the College alone would not suffice. No cameras were listed for parking structures, which surprised me given public statements that cameras would be used primarily for bike racks and parking structures. I inquired about the absence of such cameras. At first Dispatch denied the existence of any such cameras. Later, they sent a list of cameras for Pomona's first street parking structure. I inquired about the Sontag parking structure. They declined to answer any more questions and directed me to ITS. Do other cameras exist? There seem to be cameras in the garage. I did not pursue this information further.

Now that I had a list of cameras, I sent that list to Lozano. Bilger asked that Lozano consult the College's legal council and that I provide a list of "20 to 30 camera feeds, instead of all." I sent a smaller list of cameras. The lawyers requested a one page description of the project, and Lozano permitted me to continue the preperations with ITS.

A few days after reaching out to Flannery, Lozano sends me an except of an email from Bilger. He has redacted the name of the relevant Vice President.

> I just spoke with XXXXXXX, and he told me that giving the student access to the feeds is much more complicated than simply flipping a switch. He is going to send me an email explaining what steps would need to be taken, including bringing in a consultant. It's potentially expensive to do this and may not be logistically possible.

I laid out a plan to display the live feeds with trivial additional cost and offered to talk to William Morse, Vice President and Chief Information Officer of Pomona College. Lozano asked me to contact Morse.

I reached out to Morse, who relied "I need to gather additional information before I can be helpful. Someone will get back with you soon." Within the hour, Bilger emailed me to say "I spoke with your advisor, Arden Reed, yesterday evening about your project, and

as I explained to him, setting up another location where the security cameras could be viewed is logistically very challenging. The current setup in Security is quite specific. I will not be able to authorize the investment of staff time and work that your project would cost. I appreciate what you were hoping to do with the project, and I hope that you can find another project that will be equally fulfilling."

I would not get access to the live feeds. I was given an explanation of neither why my method would not work nor what made the setup logistically challenging. Determined to realize a project, I requested access to recorded footage.

Julie Journitz, Director of Client Services at ITS, emailed me to work on logistics. It seemed the project would happen. Now I needed footage. I approached Didier, who was hesitant. He worried about privacy – a common refrain. He again claimed that ITS has the footage. ITS, meanwhile, claims not to have access to the data on the server. They also claim that they do not want access to the data. They want such access to be with Campus Safety. I let the two divisions work out who would provide the footage. I requested forty-eight hours of footage from ten cameras. Campus safety worked with their IT department yet could not export more than one hour of footage at a time. I requested footage from the Studio Art Hall, but all cameras for that building were not working. In the end, Didier provided me with four video feeds each lasting a little less than an hour in addition to some short samples he provided as demos. The cameras only record when they detect motion, so I requested footage with heavy traffic. I also requested one camera use night vision. Here, we see the limits of the surveillance at Pomona College. Many cameras do not work, and although thirty days of footage is stored, only one hour can be exported at a time.

I had reserved Rose Hills Theater for over forty-eight hours and wanted to fill the time. From noon April 15 to noon April 17 2017, members of the public could enter the theater and watch recorded footage from Pomona College security cameras. One hour of footage on repeat seemed inadequate. I needed to alter and adjust the footage in some way.

I knew I wanted a grid of videos to recall the banks of displays with grids of cameras in camera control rooms such as Campus Safety dispatch. In the end, I created four video chapters for the event totaling about eight hours. All chapters consisted of a two by two grid of videos.

In the first chapter, a 1963 promotional video for the Claremont Colleges narrated by future United States President Ronald Regan played in the top right corner as the other quarters were 'normal speed' views of the College. Viewers could contrast former views of the College with the contemporary state. Does it hold the same values? How has discourse changed? The promotional video starts with footage of a riot contrasted with a Claremont Colleges' classroom. Regan opens: "Look upon this picture and now on this. The struggle for the control of the minds of men continues, but which type of control?" A similar contrast is called between the security footage and the video. The Colleges exist with the power to shape minds and control people. How do they use that power?

In the next chapter, I slowed down the footage at different rates and trimmed them to six hours. The camera angles are sometimes disorienting. People would ask me where the cameras were. Even though these students walk these paths everyday, the camera angles confused the viewers. One must reorient his/her view. The night vision provided an interesting effect; one cannot tell the time without looking at the timestamp. During the footage, the camera switches from day vision to night vision, and once the switch is made one cannot tell it the recording is from 7pm (which it is) or 2am. In another way, context is lost. Another chapter played the same footage at 'real time' speed except for one camera which was slowed by a factor of two in order to increase duration.

In the final chapter, the top right and bottom left views played Bruce Nauman's *Good Boy, Bad Boy.* Banal assertions blend as one views the camera feeds. One cannot help but connect the statements to the footage. Who is good? Who is bad? Is the the act of watching boring? Sex, eating, drinking, shitting, pissing, fear of death – many facets of life are heard. The viewer may wonder what parts of life are shown. I encountered this

work of Nauman at the Centre Georges Pompidou in Paris, France over spring break while contemplating this project. The work captivated me. The text raised questions about life which the speaker and viewer ask not only of themselves but also of each other. In my work, a third subject is introduced, the unaware subject of surveillance. The viewer asks the same questions of them. My concern is that the faces of Nauman's actors distracted viewers too much from the surveillance footage. Multiple people told me that they focused on the faces. At least, they heard the words.

The project raised questions about privacy and the role of surveillance on campus. Some asked me when the footage would come from so that they could avoid appearing. Others wanted to appear. For example, a professor of art wanted to stage some type of performance or installation for the cameras. Perhaps in the way the Surveillance Camera Players, have resisted cameras in New York City by staging silent plays, such as George Orwell's *1984* for surveillance cameras (see: Toad and Orwell (1998)). Some students wanted to know the legality and thought that other students would try to prevent the event from happening. One person made clear that she would not attend in protest. Others were impressed that I was able to acquire the footage and reserve the space for two days. The building manager for the Smith Campus Center was suspicious of leaving Rose Hills open because "we catch people fucking down there." However, the space was left open over two nights. A friend of mine went after 1am one evening and said the footage was "riveting."

I do not think that this project violated privacy. The occurrences were very public and tame. The College publicly claims that the cameras do not violate privacy to justify the existence of cameras on campus, but then at nearly every step of my request for access, I was told that there were privacy concerns. Does the administration believe its claim that the cameras do not violate privacy? If people felt uneasy about the project, the project is not the reason – the cameras themselves are. People might be watching even if the feeds are not shown publicly.

The project was, nonetheless, an act of resistance. It publicly revealed footage

typically seen only security professionals. The process exposed contradictions in the College's narrative about cameras and privacy. Beyond the inconsistent claims about the cameras not violating privacy, the discussion of use of cameras also seems unreliable. For example, Feldblum told Tidmarsh (2014) that after "individuals not affiliated with the Claremont Colleges caused damage to Skyspace, a public art installation on Pomona's campus by James Turrell PO '65. Campus Safety used surveillance footage of the damage being caused alongside a separate report about the same people from that night to implicate them in the vandalism." There are also signs at Skyspace, which indicate that the premise is under video surveillance. When I asked Campus Safety for footage of Skyspace, they stated that there is no camera monitoring Skyspace. Which claim is the truth? Most of all, the project raised awareness about cameras on campus. Most students do not think about the cameras. Peers now ask me questions about the role of cameras on campus. There is the rub. The project itself can only prompt discussion. The actions of a few artists will have limited effect without public awareness.

In the case of online surveillance, many large digital marketers such as Google, allow consumers to opt-out of targeted ads and information collection. Now, the user has more power. If s/he disables tracking, the customer may have less-tailored search results and less-personal interactions with their digital services. If this cost of privacy seems justified, the user has reclaimed some anonymity. At least, there is choice. Opting out of visual surveillance is less easy.

Some people have looked at implementing regulations. For example, Siegel, Perry, and Hunt Gram (2006) laid out recommendations for New York City surveillance cameras which include:

1. Defining "scope and purpose"

2. Offering "public notice" and discussion

3. Adequate "training and supervision of personnel"

4. Establishment of "clear rules and procedures for retention, storage and destruction of video surveillance images"

5. Explicitly prohibiting "unlawful video surveillance camera practices, and prescribe penalties for violators"

Pomona College and the Claremont Colleges overall should adopt such standards. Acceptable uses must be defined. Pomona must state whether cameras will be used to punish students for policy violations. Regular community discussion is needed to analyze current use and prevent function creep. If cameras are to be used, the College community should know about the cameras, where they are, and what their uses will be, and the community should have a say if the use will change. The beginnings of such discussion happened when the cameras were proposed, but the dialogue must continue. If protests like the one at CMC happen at Pomona how would the administration handle the footage? The campus must decide. Camera operators must be properly trained on camera policy. If Pomona College claims that its cameras are not actively monitored, Campus Safety should know not to have Pomona Cameras on its dispatch camera display. The College should know who is in charge of storing, accessing, and deleting security camera footage. I was shocked by the lack of hierarchy when requesting access. Checks must be implemented to ensure that neither the College nor College employees violate the camera regulations.

Citizens may also take stake in data collection by challenging the justifications of the data collector. Pomona College, for example, justifies its cameras by claiming that they prevent bike thefts and will be used to catch bike thieves. To assess this claim, I requested the Pomona College Clery Public Crime Log. Sixty days of records must be made available immediately. Between March 18, 2017 and April 28, 2017, there were six cases of bike theft at Pomona College. Of these cases, only one arrest is indicated in the log. I went to the Claremont Police Department to learn more about this case. The police were called after Campus Safety noticed their "bait bike" was moving. The one arrest of the six cases was a sting operation, not a capture due to identification from a security camera. This small

sample size raised concern. I wanted to analyze further, so I requested the past seven years of crime logs to see if there was a change in quantity of bike theft after cameras were added and if more perpetrators were arrested after cameras were installed.

By the Clery Act, Campus Safety must provide at least the past seven years of records within two business days of a request. Campus Safety said they would print paper copies of the records which I could examine on site. I could neither take photographs of the papers nor access a PDF of the logs. Other colleges, such as Princeton, Bowdoin, and Occidental provide their logs online. On the phone, Campus Safety stated that state law prohibited me from taking photos or possessing a copy of the logs. When asked for a citation of the law, they cited the federal Clery Act which makes the records public. Later, by email, Skipworth stated that photographing the logs "would suggest something beyond the reviewable logs as outlined by the Clery Act." That is to say, they are not legally required to let me photograph the logs, so they will not let me photograph the logs. Waugh emailed Skipworth: "it's not an issue with [Pomona College] for Campus Safety to give out a digital copy of the Clery logs to Adam for his class project." Still Campus Safety refused to allow access to a digital record or permit photographs of the paper records. Skipworth stated that he could not find a "colleague that supports this much broader interpretation" which would allow photographs or digital records. I informed him of institutions that make logs available online. At this point, Skipworth authorized the release of a digital version of the logs and additional records about bike thefts. The data came with the following notice from Skipworth's assistant:

> Director Skipworth gave his approval to release the requested information to you on a flash drive. Please note that some of the bike thefts listed on the reports, may not be included on the Clery Crime Logs. The report may have been reclassified due to the owner locating the bike, discovering the bike was impounded by Pomona Facilities, etc.
>
> Please note that the Department of Campus Safety does not guarantee (either

expressed or implied) the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or correct

sequencing of the information and the information should not be used for

comparison purposes over time. The Department of Campus Safety will not be

responsible for any error or omission, or for the use of or the results obtained

from the use of this information. The Department of Campus Safety assumes

no responsibility of liability beyond the initial dissemination of this information.

I found this disclaimer concerning. As to the first part, the Clery Act requires that no log entry be deleted after it is created. The crime could be determined to be 'unfounded,' and such a determination would be reflected in the disposition. No Pomona College Clery Log entries had a disposition of 'unfounded.' Perhaps, some entries were removed or not properly updated. The last part of the notice is language from police websites when discussing their daily logs. The only other place I could find with this language used with regard to Clery Logs is from James Maddison University's police department. Only police use this language. Why did Campus Safety state this now but not when I requested the 60 day logs? What is the log for if not the "accuracy, completeness, timeliness or correct sequencing of the information?" When I collected the logs, I asked about the disclaimer. Skipworth's assistant stated that it meant that they are not responsible for the conclusions drawn from the data and that there may be mistakes in the data. She indicated I could use this data to see the affect of cameras on bike thefts. She also stated that if an arrest was made, it should be indicated in the disposition in the Clery Logs.

I searched through through all records (Jan. 1, 2010 to May 1, 2017) for instances of bike thefts. As Campus Safety suggested, the two sources did not always agree on the number of bike thefts. The Clery Logs often (but not always) had fewer reports of bike theft. Only the Clery Logs contained disposition, so if arrest was indicated, I recorded that. The results are show in Table 1.

There is no conclusive trend in the data to decide if the cameras are deterring bike theft. After doubling the number of bike thefts in 2017 to estimate the number of thefts

what will occur during the full year and running statistical T-tests, we cannot conclude that the number of bike thefts per year are significantly different before and after 2014, when bike rack cameras were added. However, we can examine whether more arrests have been made for bike theft after cameras were installed i.e. is Campus Safety catching more bike thieves. Of the three arrests for bike theft over the past seven years, the two arrests arrests made after cameras were added were 'bait bike' operations. I wanted to learn more about the bait bikes to see if the sting relies on cameras. Didier informed me that Campus Safety does not "release information regarding specific field tactics or tools employed to frustrate the criminal element targeting our community." Given research into bait bikes and that the Claremont Police call record for the bike theft arrest in 2016 notes a "bait bike activation," we can assume that the bait bike uses GPS and does not rely on cameras. It seems that so far the cameras have neither significantly impacted bike theft rates nor improved arrest rates. Perhaps Pomona College needs to revise the narrative surrounding its security cameras.

Through a continual process of slowing, resisting, regulating, and verifying, we can create a safe and secure society. Artworks raise awareness about surveillance, and challenge the public to critically analyze the role of the camera. Consumer groups propose common sense regulations for data collection and use. Public records allow citizens and journalists to keep security groups in line. There is not one path forward. Data collectors will not self regulate as the data is too valuable to them. Citizens must voice concerns and protect all of their rights, even those which exist in opposition.

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Year	Bike Thefts (Clery Logs)	Bike Thefts (Other Report)	Arrests
2017 (through May)	12	12	1
2016	34	33	1
2015	54	56	0
2014	38	46	0
2013	23	28	1
2012	34	43	0
2011	16	36	0
2010	16	34	0

Table 1

Bike Theft and Arrests by Year (2010-2017)